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THE BP OIL SPILL SETTLEMENTS,
CLASSWIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND
SOCIETAL DETERRENCE
Catherine M. Sharkey*
INTRODUCTION
In late 2012, BP p.l.c. (BP) funded the Court Supervised Settlement
Program as part of a class action settlement of the consolidated mul-
tidistrict litigation arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico.  The BP settlement provided solely for compensatory
damages to claimants.  It left open the possibility that claimants eligi-
ble for punitive damages could be certified as a class for litigation or
settlement purposes against BP’s codefendants (but not BP) in the
future.  In 2014, Halliburton Company (Halliburton) (one of BP’s co-
defendants) reached such a classwide punitive damages settlement.
Consistent with prior work,1 in this Article I argue that, notwith-
standing formidable barriers to the certification of classwide punitive
damages, the Gulf Coast claimants should prevail, particularly if they
can articulate the societal element of punitive damages.  That element
focuses on the holistic harm to society caused by the defendant’s con-
duct as distinct from the individualistic element, which focuses on the
harms each particular plaintiff has suffered.  More specifically, class-
wide punitive damages based on a nonretributive societal rationale—
such as economic deterrence—should pass legal muster.
The BP litigation and subsequent settlements provide an opportu-
nity to explore this as-yet largely untested rationale for classwide
* Crystal Eastman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  For insightful
comments, I am grateful to participants at the Clifford Symposium at DePaul College of Law,
the Private Law Workshop at Harvard Law School, and especially Nora Engstrom, John
Goldberg, Sam Issacharoff, Robert Rabin, Teddy Rave, and Henry Smith.  Zachary Kolodin
(NYU 2014) and Jack Millman (NYU 2016) provided excellent research assistance.
1. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Future of Classwide Punitive Damages, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1127, 1148 (2013) [hereinafter Sharkey, Classwide Punitive Damages] (“My central
claim is that, to the extent that any prospects exist for punitive damages classes, . . . the fate of
these classes’ certifications rises or falls on whether courts conceptualize punitive damages as
societal or individualistic.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A
Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 50 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Exxon]
(“The ability to certify a punitive damages class going forward rests upon a distinctly societal
notion of punitive damages.”).
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supra-compensatory damages.  I have previously suggested possible
reforms based on theories of societal economic deterrence aimed to
increase the likelihood that punitive damages classes will be certified
and upheld.  One reform was directed to state legislatures:  “State leg-
islatures could affirmatively defend punitive damages based on under-
enforcement and under-deterrence rationales.  For example, states
could enact a statutory multiplier for certain torts based on the likeli-
hood of under-detection . . . .”2
Now I consider the extent to which private litigants might adopt the
same approach in negotiating class action settlements.  Class action
settlements can readily accommodate the “public law” dimension of
societal damages,3 as demonstrated by the Halliburton class settle-
ment and its explicit focus on punitive damages claims.  Indeed, on
closer inspection, even the BP compensatory damages settlement has
an aura of societal damages that surrounds it.  For even that ostensibly
purely compensatory arrangement included an unusual (and mostly
overlooked) feature: a provision for supra-compensatory multipliers
applicable to certain claimants.  I view these supra-compensatory mul-
tipliers as a form of classwide societal damages embedded within the
settlement.
The conception of an inherent public interest in punitive damages
that is distinct from the private individual’s interest in compensatory
damages is an especially powerful idea with striking implications.4
Judge Jack Weinstein, of the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York, was an early champion of this novel role for
punitive damages.  With the certification of a “punitive damages only”
class action in the multijurisdictional mass tort tobacco litigation case,
In re Simon II,5 Judge Weinstein implemented the notion that “the
punitive award can be said to constitute a punishment on behalf of
2. Sharkey, Classwide Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1148 (footnote omitted).
3. See Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 401 (2014) (“These mass harms [such as the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill] take on the quality of public law litigation, even if played out in thousands of
claims for private recompense.” (footnote omitted)); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims,
Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 205.
4. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 350
(2003) [hereinafter Sharkey, Societal Damages].
5. 211 F.R.D. 86, 107–11 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris
USA Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).  Judge Weinstein certified the
“punitive damages only” class action as a mandatory (non-opt-out) limited fund Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class. Id.  True to his principles, he emphasized the need for definitive resolution for
all parties. Id. at 107 (“A viable trial and disposition of potentially millions of claims is desirable,
appropriate and proper.”).  Indeed, Judge Weinstein encouraged the parties to consolidate fur-
ther; he entertained the idea of certifying an opt-out compensatory damages class as well.  Plain-
tiffs sought to certify only a punitive damages class, although, in Judge Weinstein’s opinion, it
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society.”6  Judge Weinstein recognized the widespread, and often dif-
fuse, harms inflicted by tobacco companies: “Punitive damages, in ad-
dition to punishing wrongful behavior, serve to compensate society for
the major civil injuries to society at large which often accompany par-
ticular heinous acts.”7  He also recognized that compensatory dam-
ages might not fully reflect the extent of the harms inflicted on society
and that punitive damages might appropriately fill the gap.8  The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Judge Weinstein’s innovative
approach to certifying a punitive damages only class.  The court va-
cated Judge Weinstein’s certification order, stopping the In re Simon
II class action in its tracks.9
But the notion of societal damages lives on.  It may be especially
relevant in resolving claims stemming from mass disasters, such as oil
spills, where the widespread harms cannot be fully remedied by indi-
vidual (or even classwide) compensatory damages awards.10
Part II of this Article explores the normative justifications for class-
wide punitive damages.  Using Judge Weinstein’s innovations in In re
Simon II as an analytical lens, the Article then evaluates the future
prospects for classwide punitive damages claims and concludes that
while aggregation based on the limited fund theory used by Judge
Weinstein in In re Simon II is in peril, aggregation based on an alter-
native societal deterrence rationale remains viable.
Part III probes how the specter of punitive damages has influenced
Gulf Coast claimants’ actions, from foregoing payments from BP’s
private compensation fund, to the claims asserted in the BP litigation
and the settlements eventually reached.  Under the Oil Pollution Act
and the court rulings of Judge Carl Barbier of the Eastern District of
Louisiana (to whom the Deepwater Horizon multidistrict litigation
would have been “preferable to have the jury decide both compensatory (opt-out) and punitive
(non-opt-out) damages for the class.” Id. at 108.
6. Id. at 104; see also Sharkey, Classwide Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1132, 1139–40
(citing In re Simon II as an example where “punitive damages have been awarded . . . as punish-
ment on behalf of the entire society . . . for particularly egregious behavior with wide-ranging
effects”).
7. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 160 (citing In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th
Cir. 2001), vacated sub nom. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008)).
8. Id. at 159 (“[Punitive damages] compensate for social damages not likely to be fully re-
flected in compensatory damages to individuals.”).
9. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d at 128.
10. President Barack Obama, remarking on the damages inflicted on states in the Gulf region
by the BP oil spill, highlighted the widespread societal aspect of that damage, emphasizing that
“[t]he sadness and the anger they feel is not just about the money they’ve lost.  It’s about a
wrenching anxiety that their way of life may be lost.”  President Barack Obama, Oval Office
Address on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/us/
politics/16obama-text.html?pagewanted=2&sq=obama%20speech&st=cse&scp=4&_r=0.
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was assigned), two categories of claimants—those with physical dam-
age to person or property, and commercial fishermen—were eligible
to receive punitive damages.
Part IV analyzes the relevance of societal damages to the compen-
satory class action settlement reached with BP and the classwide puni-
tive settlement with Halliburton.  First, it characterizes the supra-
compensatory multiplier deployed in the BP settlement as a form of
embedded societal damages.  Incredibly, it turns out that almost every
settling claimant will receive more than a 1:1 ratio of supra-compensa-
tory damages to compensatory damages.11  This significant finding is
surprising, in light of the 1:1 limit for the ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages in maritime law cases involving reckless misconduct
established by the Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co.12  Next, this
Part evaluates the Halliburton classwide punitive damages settlement
as a means of achieving further societal deterrence.
II. CLASSWIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Judge Weinstein was a pioneer in exploring the prospects of certify-
ing punitive damages classes.  In In re Simon II, he certified a nation-
wide punitive-damages-only class in a multijurisdiction,
multidefendant tobacco lawsuit, over the vehement objection of the
tobacco manufacturer–defendants.13
Judge Weinstein embraced two justifications for classwide certifica-
tion of punitive damages: (1) the “limited punishment” rationale for a
“limited fund” mandatory non-opt-out Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action;
and (2) a societal benefit rationale for punitive damages.14  The lim-
ited punishment rationale was based on the idea that the constitu-
tional due process limits the Supreme Court had established for the
amount of punitive damages allowable against a particular defendant
imposed a theoretical outer limit, or cap, on the total potential puni-
tive damages award against the tobacco companies.  This cap created,
de facto, a limited fund from which all plaintiffs would have to collect.
Judge Weinstein reasoned that if a nationwide plaintiff class were not
certified, the first plaintiffs to recover against the tobacco companies
would have a far better chance of recovering all of the punitive dam-
11. See Deepwater Horizon Economic & Property Damages Settlement Agreement as
Amended on May 2, 2012, Exhibit 15 (RTP Chart), In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Economic Fund Settlement Agreement] (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 6430-33, available at http://
www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/5.pdf.
12. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
13. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 96.
14. Id. at 159–63.
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ages they sought, whereas those who followed might run up against
the constitutionally proscribed limit on total allowable punitive
damages.15
Judge Weinstein’s equally enthusiastic embrace of the second justi-
fication, the societal benefit rationale for punitive damages, is in some
tension with the limited punishment rationale.  The societal benefit
argument, namely that the class will ensure punishment on behalf of
society, conflicts with the limited fund argument’s concern that first-
in-time plaintiffs will recover at the expense of later, deserving plain-
tiffs.  For, if punitive damages further a societal goal—in Judge Wein-
stein’s mind, primarily that of retributive punishment on behalf of
society—then there should be no concern about individual entitle-
ment as such.
In any event, neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court was
inclined to adopt either rationale.  The Second Circuit reversed Judge
Weinstein with an attack on the limited fund theory, dashing future
prospects for the limited punishment-based Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class ac-
tion.16  And the Supreme Court, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,17
all but foreclosed the limited punishment-based Rule 23(b)(1)(B) lim-
ited fund class action by emphasizing that punitive damages would be
controlled by strict constitutional limits in each individual case.18
Moreover, Williams held that punishing defendants directly for harms
to nonparties violated the defendants’ due process rights,19 and thus,
in essence, discredited a societal retributive punishment rationale for
punitive damages.
But it is far too soon to sound the death knell for classwide punitive
damages across the board.  Judge Weinstein’s innovation may have
been defeated in In re Simon II, but his embrace of a societal rationale
15. See id. at 183–85 (discussing the fear that later claimants may be precluded from recover-
ing punitive damages because of substantive due process issues).
16. Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.
2005).
17. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
18. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the
Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 453–54 (2010).  Richard
Nagareda went further and argued that, in Williams, the Supreme Court “constitutionalizes a
kind of divisible characterization for [punitive damages]” by “casting punitive damages ulti-
mately as punishment vis-a`-vis the plaintiff.”  Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in
Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1138 (2010).
19. Williams, 549 U.S. at 353–55.  Overturning Judge Weinstein’s certification in In re Simon
II, the Second Circuit (in dicta) presaged this holding by making a similar point, relying on the
Supreme Court’s prior ruling in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
“State Farm made clear that conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis must have a nexus
to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff, and that it could not be independent of or dissimi-
lar to the conduct that harms the plaintiff.” In re Simon II, 407 F.3d at 128, 139.
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for punitive damages endures—even in the face of the Supreme
Court’s seeming hostility.  In particular, classwide punitive damages
based on a nonretributive societal rationale—namely economic deter-
rence—emerge unscathed.
A. Judge Weinstein’s Pioneering Vision
Judge Weinstein’s “limited punishment” theory was an innovative
outgrowth of constitutional due process limits on total punitive dam-
ages.20  To Judge Weinstein, function trumped form as to the question
of the existence of a so-called limited fund, whose prototype was the
bankruptcy situation, in which all available assets are pooled for even-
tual pro rata distribution to creditors.  While recognizing that the Su-
preme Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard21 had sharply circumscribed the
use of limited funds beyond the insolvency situation, Judge Weinstein
nonetheless found an opening for this innovative use, given the
Court’s recognition of Rule 23’s equitable roots which, in Judge Wein-
stein’s eyes, was an invitation for innovation.22  Judge Weinstein was
further emboldened by the Court’s concession in Ortiz that it had “not
ruled out the possibility under the present Rule of a mandatory class
to deal with mass tort litigation on a limited fund rationale.”23
Judge Weinstein positioned In re Simon II within a line of cases,
most prominently In re Exxon Valdez, that supported the fledgling
limited punishment/limited fund approach.24  Defendant Exxon had
successfully sought certification of a mandatory non-opt-out punitive
20. See In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 185 (basing the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class on a theory that,
in addition to the practical limits on recovery defined by the extent of a defendant’s assets,
“[s]ubstantive due process also limits punitive damages by placing reasonable limits on punish-
ment” (quoting at In re The Exxon Valdez, No A89–0095–CV (HRH), slip op. at 8 (D. Alaska
Mar. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Order No. 180 Supplement] (“Order No. 180 Supplement (Decision
Regarding Certification of Mandatory Punitive Damages Class)”), vacated as to amount of puni-
tive award, In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)).
21. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
22. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 105; see also id. at 191 (stating that equity exists to address
new and socially important problems).
23. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 862; see also id. at 844 (“We do not . . . decide the ultimate question
whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims.”).  Judge Wein-
stein also distinguished In re Simon II from Ortiz on the ground that, in the case before him, the
court, the jury, and the nature of the issues eliminated the class conflict problems that were rife
in Ortiz. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 181 (“The Ortiz court’s rejection of the class action was
based in large part on findings that ‘the legal rights of absent class members’ had not been
adequately protected.” (quoting Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847)).
24. See In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 185 (relying on Order No. 180 Supplement, supra note
20, at 8–9); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus
denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984).
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damages class.25  As in In re Exxon Valdez, the parties in In re Simon
II did not face the prospect of a traditional limited fund created by the
bankruptcy rules.  But, following the federal district court’s reasoning
in In re Exxon Valdez, Judge Weinstein identified the limited fund
that emerged as a necessary result of the de facto aggregate cap on
excessive punitive damages, articulated in BMW v. Gore and its
progeny.26
Drawing on a line of reasoning first developed in In re Agent Or-
ange, Judge Weinstein found that these constitutional due process lim-
its on punitive damages created “a substantial probability that
‘adjudication with respect to individual members of the class . . .
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other
members not parties to the adjudication.’”27  He posited the limited
fund class action as a solution to the “potential first-in-time problem
where the first plaintiffs may recover vast sums while others who ar-
rive later are left with a depleted fund against which they cannot
recover.”28
In rejecting this reasoning wholesale, the Second Circuit hewed to
traditional conceptions of a limited fund, as delineated by the Su-
preme Court in Ortiz.29  The most significant stumbling block to Judge
Weinstein’s innovative approach, according to the Second Circuit, was
25. According to H. Russel Holland, the district court judge overseeing Exxon, the “singular
nature of the spill” created a “unique and compelling” case for certification.  Sharkey, Exxon,
supra note 1, at 48 (quoting Order No. 180 Supplement, supra note 20, at 10 (describing the
unusual nature of the oil spill case)).
26. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 184; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
574–75 (1996) (holding that the punitive damages award against BMW was grossly excessive and
unconstitutional); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
27. In re Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 185–86 (quoting In re Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D.  at 725).
Judge Weinstein also relied on “concerns about the efficient use of court resources” to justify the
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Id. at 191 (quoting Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618
(1997)).
28. Id. at 190.  Judge Weinstein drew liberally from the academic literature, including an arti-
cle co-authored by plaintiffs’ counsel, Elizabeth Cabraser. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas
M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the Transgressor: The Classwide Treatment of Puni-
tive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2021 (2000) (“‘[L]imited generosity’ (or ‘punitive
damages overkill,’ as some class members call it) is the functional equivalent of the limited fund
in that, by operation of the limited generosity principle, only a limited amount of punitive dam-
age funds will be available, regardless of the ability of the defendants to pay.  Since the purpose
of a 23(b)(1)(B) class is to avoid a judgment that ‘while not technically concluding the other
members, might do so as a practical matter,’ all persons with claims upon the ‘limited fund’
should be included in the 23(b)(1)(B) class.”).
29. See Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125, 127–28
(2d Cir. 2005) (“[P]unitive damages class must be vacated because there is no evidence by which
the district court could ascertain the limits of either the fund or the aggregate value of punitive
claims against it, such that the postulated fund could be deemed inadequate to pay all legitimate
claims,” thereby failing the Ortiz test.).
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the requirement that the fund have a “definitely ascertained limit.”30
The Second Circuit characterized the “constitutional cap,” by con-
trast, as “theoretical,” “postulated,” “not easily susceptible to . . . even
estimation,” and “therefore fundamentally unlike the classic limited
funds of the historical antecedents of Rule 23.”31  Moreover,
“[w]ithout evidence indicating either the upper limit or the insuffi-
ciency of the posited fund, class plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that in-
dividual plaintiffs would be prejudiced if left to pursue separate
actions without having their interests represented in this suit.”32
The Second Circuit was equally skeptical of what the tobacco de-
fendants termed “putting the cart before the horse,” namely, that a
punitive damages class could be certified absent an underlying com-
pensatory damages class.33  The court was concerned that
certifying a class that seeks an assessment of punitive damages prior
to an actual determination and award of compensatory damages . . .
would fail to ensure that a jury will be able to assess an award that,
in the first instance, will bear a sufficient nexus to the actual and
potential harm to the plaintiff class.34
If In re Simon II signaled uneasiness with the certification of a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action based on the limited punishment
rationale, as I (and others) have argued, the Supreme Court’s Philip
Morris USA v. Williams decision effectively shuts it down.  Still, as I
(but not others) have also gone on to argue, Williams should not be
read to foreclose classwide punitive damages across the board.  These
can survive in either Rule 23(b)(2) equitable relief or Rule 23(b)(3)
monetary damages class actions,35 where such damages could be justi-
fied by nonretributive societal rationales.
30. Id. at 137 (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 841 (1999)).
31. Id. at 138.
32. Id.
33. Id.  The tobacco defendants argued:
A claim for punitive damages is not a separate and distinct cause of action: rather it is
auxiliary to, and dependent upon, the existing of an underlying claim.  As such, any
award of punitive damages can only be entered after awarding damages in conjunction
with an underlying and successful claim for actual damages.
Brief for Defendant–Appellant at 94–95, In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125 (Nos. 03-7140, 03-7141)
(quoting Liggett Grp. Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).  The tobacco
defendants relied on the Florida appellate court’s reasoning in Engle, 853 So. 2d at 456 (“The
trial plan in the instant case required the defendants to pay punitive damages for supposed inju-
ries to thousands of class members without the necessary prerequisite findings of liability and
compensatory damages.  Since the class-wide punitive damages award improperly places the pro-
verbial ‘cart before the horse,’ it must be reversed.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 945 So. 2d 1246
(Fla. 2006).
34. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d at 138.
35. The Halliburton Settlement is a Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damages class action. See infra
Part IV.B.
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B. Societal Rationales
Punitive damages are typically justified by courts and commentators
as a means of retributive punishment or economic deterrence.36  In
individual cases, punitive damages may be deemed the essential way
to achieve retribution for particularly reprehensible conduct.  Alterna-
tively, the economic justification for punitive damages is to force a
defendant to internalize the total societal costs of its misconduct, costs
that inevitably exceed compensatory damages.37  Indeed, large puni-
tive damages awards in single-plaintiff cases might be aptly character-
ized as a version of the “poor man’s class action.”38  This is because
class actions involving solely compensatory damages are considered
an alternative, and superior, mechanism to force a defendant to inter-
nalize the total costs of widespread harms.
In light of this striking similarity between class actions and punitive
damages on the economic deterrence account, it is fitting to ask: Does
the prospect of class action lawsuits, as opposed to lawsuits by individ-
ual plaintiffs, alter the conventional rationales for punitive damages?
More specifically, what (if any) is the best justification for awarding
punitive damages on a classwide basis?
In the class action setting, punitive damages can be justified by soci-
etal retributive punishment or economic deterrence rationales, so long
as the class stands as a proxy for the wider society, i.e., a broader
population than the certified class.  Under the societal retributive pun-
ishment rationale, punitive damages “stand as a civil penalty for the
transgression of the social compact,”39 and the class “stand[s] as [a]
proxy for society, [vindicating] society’s interest in punishment.”40
36. See, e.g., Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34–35 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing various justifica-
tions for punitive damages, such as preventing underdeterrence, deterring behavior that has no
redeemable social value, and expressing the moral outrage of the community); Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is that [punitive damages] are
aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”);
Sharkey, Societal Damages, supra note 4, at 400 (discussing how punitive damages could deal
with diffuse harms by forcing defendant to internalize the full cost of their actions).
37. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 889–90 (1998) (“[T]he optimal level of punitive damages from the perspec-
tive of deterrence is the level of total damages determined by the formula, less compensatory
damages.  If an injurer has a one-in-four chance of being found liable for causing a $100,000
harm, the formula implies that total damages should be $400,000.  Because $100,000 of this total
represents compensatory damages, the $300,000 remainder is the optimal amount of punitive
damages.”).
38. Sharkey, Societal Damages, supra note 4, at 404.
39. Cabraser & Sobol, supra note 28, at 2006.
40. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive
Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 979, 1008 (2001).
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Because Williams effectively forecloses this punishment-based societal
rationale,41 an economic deterrence (i.e., nonretributive) societal ra-
tionale gains greater potential significance.  Indeed, as I have argued,
to the extent that punitive damages embody a nonretributive societal
deterrence objective, a punitive damages class should be more, not
less, prone to certification than any compensatory damages class,
which is more likely to encompass individuals who have suffered idio-
syncratic injuries.42
To be sure, the societal economic deterrence rationale may be
weaker in the class action context as compared with individual actions,
because the very premise of a class action is that “all claimants are (or
will be) before the court.”43  If one defines the entirety of societal
damages as equal to the sum of compensatory damages, then a puni-
tive damages award would be superfluous from a cost-internalization
perspective.  But, I argue, that definition is incomplete, as “un-
derdeterrence arising from defendants’ ability to evade liability for
wrongdoing” may persist, even in a class action case.44  Class actions
are an effective way to address “negative value claims” that are not
economically viable to bring as individual claims, but they are less ef-
fective antidotes to other sources of underdeterrence, such as torts
that are elusive or difficult to prove, or more diffuse societal harms.
41. While the Supreme Court has held that a defendant cannot be punished for harms to
others not before the court, evidence of those harms can nonetheless be considered when it
comes to how “reprehensible” the defendant’s conduct was. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007) (“Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and
so was particularly reprehensible . . . .”).
42. Sharkey, Classwide Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1133 (providing case law support
for this theory that how the court conceptualizes punitive damages affects the likelihood of class
certification).  The notion of societal damages, nonetheless, raises a host of formidable procedu-
ral concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article.  First and foremost, who has standing to
bring such a claim?  Who is bound by the determination?  Is there res judicata from a plaintiff’s
victory?  From a plaintiff’s loss?  How is the money distributed?  Is it a stand-alone action or
does it depend on prior consolidation either through a class action or centralizing multidistrict
litigation?
43. Sharkey, Societal Damages, supra note 4, at 410–11.
44. Id. at 366. Exxon Valdez is a case in point.  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471
(2008).  Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act in part in response to Exxon’s having avoided
paying damages to many parties clearly harmed by the spill. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 959 (E.D.
La. 2011), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014).  Disasters such
as the Exxon-Valdez oil spill can also cause unanticipated long-term harm that takes years to
surface. See Doug Struck, Twenty Years Later, Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Linger, YALE
E’NVT 360 (Mar. 24, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/twenty_years_later_impacts__of_the_ex
xon_valdez_linger/2133/.
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III. ROLE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE BP OIL SPILL
The specter of punitive damages has hung over the BP oil spill from
the moment of the April 20, 2010 catastrophe.  The prospect of puni-
tive damages was a major factor in the plaintiffs’ decisions to forego
payment from BP’s alternative private dispute resolution compensa-
tion fund, known as the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), and in-
stead to sue BP and its codefendants.  In a series of complaints, the
plaintiffs asserted claims for punitive damages based implicitly on the-
ories of societal punishment and economic deterrence.
In the course of the multidistrict litigation, Judge Barbier made a
key ruling that a significant portion of the oil spill victims would be
able to pursue punitive damages claims against BP and its codefend-
ants.  Thus, even after the comprehensive class action settlement with
BP, many victims retained punitive damages claims against codefend-
ants Halliburton and Transocean Ltd. (Transocean)—including BP’s
own punitive damages claims against its codefendants (which it as-
signed to the plaintiff class in the settlement), as well as a portion of
the class’s reserved direct punitive damages claims against the code-
fendants.  Differences among subgroups of plaintiffs in terms of their
eligibility for punitive damages likely influenced the settlement nego-
tiations between the parties.
A. Gulf Coast Claims Facility
In the wake of the BP oil spill, negotiations between high-level BP
officials and President Obama resulted in the prompt creation of the
$20 billion Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), funded by BP to sat-
isfy BP’s obligations to injured parties under the Oil Pollution Act.45
Kenneth Feinberg was appointed as special master to oversee and ad-
minister the fund.46
Over a two-year period, the GCCF paid more than $6.5 billion to
over 220,000 claimants.47  Its mission was to compensate claimants for
45. See Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency
and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 255, 261 (2011)
(describing how after the President and his staff negotiated with BP to create the $20 billion
fund, he used his first nationwide Oval Office address to announce its creation).
46. Id.
47. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42942, DEEP-
WATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: RECENT ACTIVITIES AND ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2014), avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42942.pdf (finding that the GCCF had paid $6.67 billion
as of June 4, 2012); see also BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF
COAST CLAIMS FACILITY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/697201241917226179477.pdf (finding that the GCCF made payments “to over
220,000 individual and business claimants”).
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lost earnings or profits, removal and clean-up costs, damage to real or
personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, and
physical injury or death.48
The GCCF did not award punitive damages.49  Feinberg’s explana-
tion for this zeroed in on but one of the two central purposes that
punitive damages serve: “I’m not begrudging anybody who wants pu-
nitive damages.  If you want punitive damages, don’t take anything
from the fund.  Punitive damages is a judicial concept.  I have no idea
whether punitive damages are even credible here.  This is a fund de-
signed to compensate for loss, not punish BP.”50  The prospect of pu-
nitive damages may have motivated many of the victims to choose
litigation over accepting final payments from the GCCF.51
B. BP Class Action Litigation
Dissatisfied with the GCCF, many potential claimants—including
commercial fishermen, oyster farmers, business owners and their em-
ployees, and coastal property owners—opted to forgo GCCF final
payments and instead filed lawsuits in courts throughout the Gulf
Coast states.52
48. According to an independent audit conducted by BDO Consulting:
In Phase I [the Emergency Advanced Payment claims process], . . . the GCCF imple-
mented an interim claims process by which eligible claimants would receive compensa-
tion for [losses] caused by the Spill by submitting a lesser level of documentation than
would be required in Phase II of the GCCF.  During Phase II [the Interim Payment/
Final Payment claims process], the GCCF received claims for both interim payments
designed to compensate claimants for past losses and final payments designed to com-
pensate claimants for past and future losses.
BDO CONSULTING, supra note 47, at 3.
49. Although the GCCF did not award punitive damages, it did provide “future recovery fac-
tors,” multipliers to demonstrated past economic losses.  Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 3, at
406.  For further discussion of the GCCF multipliers and a comparison with the multipliers
deployed in the BP class action settlement, see infra Part III.A.1.
50. Stier, supra note 45, at 263 n.70 (emphasis added) (quoting Laura Parker, A Conversation
with BP’s Pay Czar, Kenneth Feinberg, AOL NEWS (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.aolnews.com/
2011/01/10/a-conversation-with-bps-pay-czar-kenneth-feinberg/).
51. See, e.g., Rebecca Mowbray, Judge Allows Some Punitive Damages in BP Oil Spill Law-
suits, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 29, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/in-
dex.ssf/2011/08/judge_dismisses_bp_oil_spill_c.html (“[Judge] Barbier’s allowance of  punitive
damages could be highly influential on whether commercial fishers, oyster harvesters and coastal
property owners choose to stay in the litigation or take a settlement from the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility.”).
52. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 3, at 401 (discussing how the GCCF failed to prevent a
large influx of litigation); see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf
of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), Doc. 1098 (order granting in
part the plaintiffs’ Motion to Supervise Ex Parte Communications with Putative Class), available
at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/222011OrderonRecDoc912.pdf (finding that the
GCCF is not truly independent from BP, leading to confusion and misunderstandings for claim-
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In the consolidated BP oil spill lawsuits, the plaintiffs sued BP
(which leased the rig and operated the oil and gas prospect), Trans-
ocean (which owned the rig), and Halliburton (which worked the rig
and poured concrete).53  Most of the litigation was consolidated into
Multidistrict Litigation 2179 and assigned to Judge Barbier.54  A
court-appointed plaintiffs’ steering committee began negotiating with
the defendants while simultaneously preparing for trial.55
ants; citing Feinberg’s statements that claimants would be better off “accepting what he offers
rather than going to court” as an example of a problematic statement).
53. B1 Bundle First Amended Master Complaint at paras. 210, 223, 226, In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D.
La. 2011) [hereinafter B1 Bundle] (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 1128.  The plaintiffs also sued
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (Anadarko) (owner of a minority stake of the prospect),
Cameron International Corporation (Cameron) (manufacturer of the blowout preventer), Mit-
sui Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. (MOECO) (owner of MOEX USA Corporation (MOEX), which
owned a minority stake of the prospect), and Weatherford International (Weatherford) (manu-
facturer of the oil field equipment). Id. paras. 233, 230, 235–37, 231.  BP entered into settlement
agreements with these parties, released all claims against them, and agreed to indemnify them
from any third-party civil liability in exchange for monetary payments. See Press Release,
MOECO, Settlement of Claims Arising from Gulf Oil Spill (May 20, 2011), http://
www.moeco.com/en/news/2011/05/settlement-of-claims-arising-from-gulf-oil-spill.html (stating
that MOECO is paying $1.065 billion to BP); Press Release, John Christiansen, Anadarko,
Anadarko Announces Settlement with BP (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.anadarko.com/Investor/
Pages/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?release-id=1617533 (stating that Anadarko is paying
$4 billion to BP); Tom Fowler, Weatherford Settles with BP over Spill Claims, HOUS. CHRON.
(June 21, 2011), http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Weatherford-settles-with-BP-
over-spill-claims-2082056.php (stating that Weatherford is paying $75 million to BP); Alison
Sider, Cameron Won’t Face Punitive Damages in Deepwater Horizon Spill Trial, EUROINVESTOR
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.euroinvestor.com/news/2013/03/21/cameron-wonapost-face-punitive-
damages-in-deepwater-horizon-spill-trial/12257498 (stating that Cameron is paying BP $250 mil-
lion).  Judge Barbier subsequently granted Cameron’s motion for judgment denying the plain-
tiffs’ claims for punitive damages.  Sider, supra.  He also found that MOEX and Anadarko
cannot be sued under maritime law.  Margaret Cronin Fisk & Jef Feeley, BP Seeks To Prove
Gulf Spill Errors Weren’t Negligence, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-02-25/bp-seeks-to-prove-gulf-spill-errors-weren-t-grossly-negligent.html.  In addition,
he found M-I SWACO (M-I), a provider of drilling-fluid that was sued by the plaintiffs, not
liable and dismissed it from the lawsuit.  Sider, supra.
54. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179, at 1, 5 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010) (order transferring actions to the Eastern
District of Louisiana), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/Orders/MDL_Transfer_
Order.pdf.
55. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 2010) (order appointing the Plaintiffs’ Steering Commit-
tee and the Plaintiff Executive Committee), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/
Orders/PTO8.pdf.
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1. Punitive Damages Claims
The plaintiffs asserted claims for punitive damages based on the
egregiousness of the defendants’ conduct as well as the widespread
nature of the destruction and devastation wrought by their conduct.56
In their complaints, the plaintiffs emphasized the need for punish-
ment given the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct:
Defendants engaged in conduct so reckless, willful, wanton and in
such utter and flagrant disregard for the safety and health of the
public and the environment in their activities leading up to and/or
during the Deepwater Horizon Incident . . . that an award of puni-
tive damages against them at the highest possible level is warranted
and necessary to impose effective and optimal punishment . . . .57
But the plaintiffs also asserted a societal economic deterrence ratio-
nale for punitive damages: “[P]iecemeal adjudications may under-de-
ter Defendants’ misconduct by failing to account for the full scope or
total social costs, thereby frustrating the purpose of punitive dam-
ages—the vindication of society’s interests in deterrence . . . that is
fully and fairly proportionate to . . . its harm to society as a whole.”58
In the wake of the large-scale devastation to the affected communi-
ties, the environment, and society at large, the plaintiffs pressed socie-
tal justifications for punitive damages based on both punishment and
economic deterrence theories.59
2. Claimants’ Eligibility for Punitive Damages
Before the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act60 (Act or OPA) in
1990, persons who suffered purely economic losses (unaccompanied
by physical damage to land or other proprietary interest) resulting
from an oil spill were barred from recovery by a longstanding admi-
56. Amended Class Action Complaint for Private Economic Losses & Property Damages at
131–36, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) [hereinafter Amended Class Action Complaint] (MDL
No. 2179), Doc. 6412, available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/Orders/05032012(Amen
dedEconomicClassComplaint).pdf.  The plaintiffs’ causes of action included federal common law
general maritime claims for negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct, as well as state
common law claims for nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment. Id. at 113–31.  Judge
Barbier held that the state law nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment claims were pre-
empted by federal maritime law. In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (“State law, both statu-
tory and common, is preempted by maritime law . . . .”).
57. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 56, at 132, Doc. 6412 (emphasis added).
58. B1 Bundle, supra note 53, at 154, Doc. 1128 (emphasis added).
59. See B3 Bundle First Amended Master Complaint at 74, In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943
(MDL No. 2179), Doc. 1805-1 (“[A]n award of punitive damages against them at the highest
possible level is warranted and necessary to impose effective and optimal punishment and
deterrence.”).
60. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484.
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ralty law rule, dating from the 1927 Supreme Court case Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.61  A narrow exception to this rule was
carved out for commercial fishermen, who could assert general mari-
time and punitive damages claims.62
The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill prompted Congress to address the
legal barriers to recovery to anyone other than commercial fishermen
by enacting a comprehensive scheme for economic damages recovery
in the wake of an oil spill.  The Oil Pollution Act altered the common
law landscape by allowing any claimant who suffered economic losses
to pursue a claim against what it termed a “responsible party.”63  The
Act also streamlined recovery by holding any such responsible party
strictly liable for “clean up costs and resulting economic damages.”64
The Act limited a responsible party’s liability for damages relating to
an incident involving a mobile offshore drilling unit to removal costs
plus approximately $75 million, but the limit did not apply if “the inci-
dent was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct.”65
Jurisdictions are divided over whether the OPA displaces general
maritime law and bars recovery of punitive damages.66  Punitive dam-
61. 275 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1927) (barring recovery for pure economic losses unaccompanied by
physical damage to a proprietary interest).
62. Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173–74 (E.D. La. 1981) (allowing purely
economic claims for an oil spill to proceed because commercial fishermen raise unique consider-
ations), aff’d, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973).
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has attempted to clarify the justification for the widely ac-
knowledged “fishermen’s exception” to the economic loss rule:
A public nuisance involving harm to a natural resource most often arises from contami-
nation of waterways, as when a defendant spills toxic chemicals into the sea and thus
causes economic injury to those who depend on it for commercial or recreational pur-
poses.  Courts typically recognize fishermen as a class of plaintiffs who suffer special
injury in those circumstances and allow them to recover in tort.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 8 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2014); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. h, ex. 11 (1979) (“A pollutes
public waters, killing all of the fish.  B, who has been operating a commercial fishery in these
waters, suffers pecuniary loss as a result.  B can recover for the public nuisance.”).
63. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1002(a), (b)(2)(E), 104 Stat. 484, 489–90,
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(2)(E) (2012).  The OPA defines a “Responsible Party” as “any person
owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel.” Id. § 1001(32)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A).
All Responsible Parties are strictly liable, as well as jointly and severally liable for removal costs
plus damages in connection with a discharge of oil into covered waters.
64. In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
65. OPA § 1004(a)(3), (c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3), (c)(1)(A).
66. Compare In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (holding that punitive damages are availa-
ble under the OPA for claimants who would have had general maritime claims pre-OPA), with S.
Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that puni-
tive damages are not available under the OPA).
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ages are not listed in the Act’s “comprehensive list” of recoverable
damages.67  Despite this, Judge Barbier ruled that the Act does not
preclude parties from seeking punitive damages if those parties would
have been able to seek punitive damages under general maritime law
prior to the OPA’s enactment.68  Judge Barbier’s ruling that punitive
damages are not barred as a matter of law in federal maritime cases
relied on two key Supreme Court decisions: the ruling in Exxon
Valdez,69 which held that the Clean Water Act did not displace the
general maritime remedy for punitive damages,70 and Atlantic Sound-
ing Co. v. Townsend,71 which held that the Jones Act did not displace
the availability of punitive damages for a seaman’s claim.72
Pursuant to Judge Barbier’s ruling, punitive damages are thus avail-
able in limited circumstances under general maritime law governed by
Robins Dry Dock: to (1) those with physical damage to person or
property; or (2) commercial fishermen.
IV. SOCIETAL DAMAGES IN CLASS SETTLEMENTS
After months of negotiation, on March 2, 2012, plaintiffs and BP
agreed to a classwide settlement, which concedes class certification for
the purpose of settlement only.73  Both sides claimed victory in the
press.  BP proclaimed a final resolution to all “legitimate economic
loss and medical claims.”74  Two leading plaintiffs’ negotiators de-
scribed the settlement in glowing terms, stating that it secured “the
greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people.”75  Judge
Barbier certified the settlement class under Rule 23(b)(3), holding
67. S. Port Marine, 234 F.3d at 64 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)).
68. In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (“Plaintiffs who could assert general maritime claims
pre-OPA enactment may plausibly allege punitive damages under general maritime [law].”).
Note that the question whether the Act preempts state law punitive damages claims remains
open.  The BP and codefendants’ litigation and settlements are governed by federal maritime
law and thus do not raise such state law questions.
69. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
70. Id. at 488–89.
71. 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
72. Id. at 424–25; see also Lauren E. Hume, Note, Are We Sailing in Occupied Waters?: Re-
thinking the Availability of Punitive Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1444, 1464–69 (2011) (foreshadowing Judge Barbier’s holding based on an analysis of Ex-
xon Shipping and Atlantic).
73. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, § 7.2, at 62, Doc. 6430-1.  The set-
tlement’s effective date was April 18, 2012.  Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note
11, at 1, Doc. 6430-1.
74. Steven Mufson, BP, Plaintiffs Reach Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Settlement, WASH. POST
(Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bp-plaintiffs-reach-gulf-of-
mexico-oil-spill-settlement/2012/03/02/gIQAL9OwnR_story.html.
75. See id.
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that it satisfied all of the class action requirements.76  Two and one-
half years later, on September 2, 2014, one of BP’s codefendants, Hal-
liburton, tentatively settled with the combined class of claimants hold-
ing punitive damages claims against it.77
This Part considers the extent to which these class settlements ac-
commodate what I have termed societal damages, whether or not ex-
plicitly termed punitive damages.
A. Embedded Societal Damages in the BP Settlement
The inclusion of damage multipliers, which are termed “risk trans-
fer premiums” or RTPs, in the BP class action settlement mimics a
complex multiple damages statute, providing various supra-compensa-
tory multipliers for different types of claims.  I argue that these RTPs
incorporate an embedded societal punitive damages award, which is
confirmed by the fact that the RTPs for punitive damages-eligible
claimants (primarily those in commercial fishermen categories) are
much higher than those for other claimant categories.  My argument is
bolstered by the parties’ own recognition that the RTPs were, in sig-
nificant part, a surrogate or stand-in for punitive damages—which
were not included as a separate component of the settlement.78  More-
over, juxtaposing the supra-compensatory multipliers included in the
class action settlement with the much lower effective multipliers of-
fered under the GCCF (deemed “future recovery factors”) strength-
76. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 913–64 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739
F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014).  The agreement was amended and preliminarily approved by the Court
on May 2, 2012. See Notice of Filing of the Economic & Property Damages Settlement Agree-
ment as Amended on May 2, 2012 & as Preliminarily Approved by the Court on May 2, 2012, at
1, In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 6430.  Judge Barbier’s order con-
tains a comprehensive review of the evidence (over ninety-two pages) to demonstrate that the
class satisfied all of the necessary legal requirements. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 913–41.
Judge Barbier likewise devotes ample attention (over forty pages) to refute specific objections
raised. Id. at 941–64.
77. HESI Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement at 1, In re Oil Spill,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891 [hereinafter Halliburton Settlement] (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 13346:1, availa-
ble at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/9022014HESISettlement.pdf.
78. See, e.g., BP Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Deep-
water Horizon Economic & Property Damages Settlement Agreement as Amended on May 2,
2012, at 68–69, In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 7114-1 (“[E]ven apart
from BP’s position that punitive damages are unavailable, the contemplated RTP payments
plainly serve as a surrogate for any benefits that punitive damages might otherwise provide (as
well as a liquidation of any claimed rights to punitive damages).”); Plaintiff’s Memo in Support
of Motion for Final Approval of Economic & Property Damages Settlement Agreement at 25, In
re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 7104-1 (“[T]he higher RTPs are generally
afforded to industries and locations which face the greatest risk of ongoing loss and/or are most
likely to have claims for punitive damages.”).
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ens the case that the RTPs represent a form of societal damages given
to the classes of claimants eligible to receive punitive damages.
1. RTPs or Damage Multipliers
The BP Settlement Class consists of private individuals and busi-
nesses defined by geographic location and the nature of their losses.79
As is typical in mass tort settlements, the parties’ lawyers negotiated a
claims grid that compensates class members based on the relative
strength of their claims.80  The settlement contains compensation for-
mulas for different categories of damages, such as economic losses or
property damage.81  In one category, the Seafood Compensation Pro-
gram, the parties agreed to a guaranteed $2.3 billion payment.82  BP’s
total payout is not, however, capped.83
79. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (defining a qualifying claimant as one who falls
within the geographic region of “Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and certain coastal counties in
eastern Texas and western Florida, as well as specified adjacent Gulf waters and bays”).  Fur-
thermore, claimants must have “lived, worked, or owned or leased property in the area between
April 20, 2010 and April [16], 2012, and businesses must have conducted activities in the area
during that same time frame.” Id.
80. The parties set up a special master allocation process in which various representatives of
the various affected groups made presentations on the strength of their claims. Id. at 918
(describing the process “using a Court-appointed neutral . . . to determine the initial and subse-
quent allocations [of the Seafood Compensation Program]”); Special Master, PERRY, ATKINSON,
BALHOFF, MENGIS, BURNS & ELLIS, L.L.C., http://www.pabmb.com/practice-areas/special-
master (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) (discussing firm attorneys’ role as special master in developing
methodology for allocating BP’s Seafood Compensation Program settlement fund).
81. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 903–04.  The six categories are: “(1) specified types of
economic loss for businesses and individuals, (2) specified types of real property damage
(coastal, wetlands, and real property sales damage), (3) Vessel of Opportunity Charter Payment,
(4) Vessel Physical Damage, (5) Subsistence Damage, and (6) the Seafood Compensation Pro-
gram.” Id. at 903.  Each category contains a different formula laid out in the Economic Fund
Settlement Agreement. See Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibits
1A–27, Docs. 6430-3 to 6430-46 (detailing various requirements and formulae to recover dam-
ages under the six categories).
82. The terms of the agreement state, “The SCP is expected to pay out an initial $1.9 billion in
compensation to class members, leaving a $400 million reserve to be distributed in a second
round.” In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 908–09.  The settlement was based on objective losses
of the seafood industry and category multipliers; the number of claimants was not relevant to the
calculus. See id. at 909 (“The guaranteed total of $2.3 billion allocated to the SCP represents
approximately five times the annual average industry gross revenue for 2007 to 2009 . . . .  $2.3
billion also represents 19.2 times lost industry revenue in 2010 . . . .”).
83. Id. at 904 (“With the exception of the Seafood Compensation Program, there is no cap on
the amounts that may be paid under the Settlement Agreement.”).  BP may have feared that
capping the total payout would have raised potential intraclass conflicts (of the sort warned
against by the Supreme Court in Amchem and Ortiz) that could threaten certification of the
class. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–28 (1997) (holding that conflicts of
interest between class members require the class to be decertified); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 863–65 (1999) (holding that the requirement of intraclass equity per Rule
23(a) cannot be lowered because of time constraints, and decertifying the class accordingly).  In
this vein, the parties highlighted that the settlement was not a “zero-sum game.” In re Oil Spill,
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The most interesting feature of the compensation grid is the RTPs.
Where applicable, these multipliers are applied to the base compensa-
tion amount, and the product is then added to the base compensation
awarded.  As the Settlement document explains:
To the extent that an RTP is to be paid to a Claimant, it shall be a
factor which is multiplied with those Compensation Amounts which
the Exhibits to this Agreement specify are eligible for an RTP to
calculate a sum which is added to the Compensation Amount paid
to the Claimant.  For example, if the Compensation Amount is $1,
and the RTP is 2.5, then $1 is multiplied by 2.5, which product is
then added to the $1 to reach the total amount of compensation ($1
+ $2.50 = $3.50 in total compensation).84
The compensation grid provides for varying RTPs based on the rela-
tive strength of claims, including eligibility for punitive damages.85
Specifically, the RTP compensates class members for “potential future
loss, as well as pre-judgment interest, any risk of oil returning, any
claims for consequential damages, inconvenience, aggravation, the
lost value of money, compensation for emotional distress, liquidation
of legal disputes about punitive damages, and other factors.”86  In
other words, the RTP is designed not only to compensate class mem-
bers for future injuries (potential future loss and any risk of oil re-
turning), claims with a low likelihood of success (consequential
damages), damages based on the temporal nature of the litigation
(lost value of money, prejudgment interest), and noneconomic dam-
ages (inconvenience, aggravation, and compensation for emotional
distress), but also to encompass some measure of expected punitive
damages.
While entitlement to punitive damages is just one factor among
many included in the RTP, a close analysis of the relevant tables
reveals it to be a highly significant factor.  Commercial fishermen are
eligible for punitive damages under the Robins Dry Dock exception,
whereas other claimants, such as seafood processors, are not.87  Under
the settlement terms, the vast majority of subgroups eligible for puni-
910 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (“[T]he claims frameworks offering generally uncapped compensation
ensure that a benefit paid to one member of the class will in no way reduce or interfere with a
benefit obtained by another member.”).
84. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, § 38.126, at 107–08, Doc. 6430-1.
85. Id.
86. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 904; see also Economic Fund Settlement Agreement,
supra note 11, Exhibit 15 (RTP Chart), at 1, Doc. 6430-33 (“[A]n RTP (risk transfer premium)
shall mean the amount paid to a Claimant for any and all alleged damage . . . including claims for
punitive damages.”).
87. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (noting that “commercial fishermen fall within an
arguable exception to Robins Dry Dock and thus conceivably could be eligible for punitive dam-
ages while processors are not”).
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tive damages are included within the “Seafood Compensation Pro-
gram,” which “shall cover and compensate Commercial Fishermen,
Seafood Boat Captains, all other Seafood Crew, Oyster Leaseholders,
and Seafood Vessel Owners for economic loss claims relating to Sea-
food.”88  The RTPs for the Seafood Compensation Program claims are
significantly higher than the RTPs for even the most highly compen-
sated claims outside the Seafood Compensation Program.  The com-
mercial fishermen’s (and other boat captains’, crews’, and ship
owners’) eligibility for punitive damages likely explains the higher
RTPs for the Seafood Compensation Program.  I argue that the RTP
is essentially fulfilling the purpose that punitive damages would fill if
the litigation were to proceed.
Table 1 illustrates how the RTP may be aptly characterized as incor-
porating an embedded punitive award.  Compare, for example, the
highest RTP for Seafood Compensation claimants—an RTP of 8.75
for oyster vessel owners or lessees89—with the highest RTP outside of
the Seafood Compensation Program—an RTP of 3.0 for shrimp, crab,
and oyster processors (included within the “business economic loss
claims” category).90  This disparity implies that punitive damages eligi-
bility played a significant role in increasing the RTPs for claimants
within the Seafood Compensation Program, potentially increasing
damages by up to 5.75 over the 3.0 baseline [8.75:1 – 3.00:1 = 5.75:1].91
Moreover, the de facto multiplier for the Seafood Compensation Pro-
gram (which includes the claims eligible for punitive damages) is
likely to be even higher, given the $2.3 billion guaranteed payment.92
88. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibit 10, at 3, Doc. 6430-22.  All
of the categories included in the Seafood Compensation Program qualify under the Robins Dry
Dock commercial fishermen’s exception.
89. Id. at 35–36.
90. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibit 15 (RTP Chart), at 1, Doc.
6430-33.  Shrimp, crab, and oyster processors receive an RTP of 3.0, giving them the highest RTP
for non-Seafood Compensation Program Claimants. See id. at 1–4.
91. This “kicker” to punitive damages-eligible claims might also have factored into the negoti-
ations leading up to the $2.3 billion guaranteed payment to the Seafood Compensation Program.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. The settlement agreement contemplates an initial $1.9 billion compensatory payment, with
$400 million in reserve, to be distributed in a subsequent round. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d
at 908–09.
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TABLE 1: BP CLASS SETTLEMENT RTP CATEGORIES
[SHADED DENOTES PUNITIVE-DAMAGES ELIGIBLE CLAIMS]
Type of Claim RTP Range
Business Economic Loss Claims 0.25–3.00 (depending on zone and
industry)
Employee Claims 0.25–3.00 (depending on zone and
industry)
Individual Periodic Vendors 1.00
Subsistence Claims 2.25
Coastal Real Property Claims 2.50 (excluding physical damage
compensation from the denominator)
Wetlands Real Property Claims 2.50 (excluding physical damage
compensation from the denominator)
Seafood Compensation Program: Ship 4.50–7.75 (depending on industry)
Captain Claims
Seafood Compensation Program: Ship 5.50–8.25 (depending on industry)
Owner/Lessee Claims (except Oyster
Ship Owner/Lessee Claims)
Seafood Compensation Program: 8.75
Oyster Ship Owner/Lessee Claims
The case for characterizing the RTPs as an embedded societal dam-
ages stand-in for punitive damages is, moreover, strengthened by a
comparison with the effective multiplier included in the GCCF for
“future recovery factors.”93  The effective supra-compensatory multi-
pliers diverge primarily with respect to the classes of claimants eligible
for punitive damages.  Recall that the GCCF did not include punitive
damages.  Thus, if one were to “net out” the GCCF “future recovery
factor” multiplier from the RTP multiplier, the residual plausibly
might be considered punitive damages.  To take an example, shrimp
ship owners received an RTP of 8.25 under the Class Settlement,
whereas the maximum effective GCCF multiplier for that class of
claimants was 3.00.
93. The GCCF “future recovery factor” multipliers are listed in Issacharoff & Rave, supra
note 3, at 406.  In order to make the comparison, the effective GCCF multipliers in Table 2 have
been reduced by 1 because the GCCF multipliers include base damages—whereas the RTPs are,
in effect, a multiplier add-on to base damages. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2: CLASS SETTLEMENT RTPS COMPARED TO GCCF
BP Class Settlement GCCF “Future Recovery
Type of Claim RTP Multiplier Factor” Multiplier
Business Economic Loss 0.25–3.00 1.00
Claims
Employee Claims 0.25–3.00 1.00
Individual Periodic Vendors 1.00 1.00
Subsistence Claims 2.25 1.00
Coastal Real Property Claims 2.50 N/A (not compensated)
Wetlands Real Property 2.50 N/A (not compensated)
Claims
Seafood Compensation 4.50–7.75 1.00–3.00
Program: Ship Captain Claims
Seafood Compensation 5.50–8.25 1.00–3.00
Program: Ship Owner/Lessee
Claims (except Oyster Ship
Owner/Lessee Claims)
Seafood Compensation 8.75 6.00
Program: Oyster Ship Owner/
Lessee Claims
2. Are Societal Damages Justified?
A striking feature that emerges from Table 1 is that most categories
of settlement claimants receive an RTP multiplier greater than 1.  This
is significant in light of the fact that the  Supreme Court limited puni-
tive damages in the admiralty context in Exxon Shipping Co. to a 1:1
punitive to compensatory ratio.94  In other words, the settlement con-
templates supra-compensatory multipliers on a grander scale than that
contemplated in Exxon Shipping Co. and, in any event, does not con-
sider the 1:1 ratio an outer limit.  Indeed, the median RTP in the set-
tlement is 2.25.  Twelve out of forty-two categories of claimants
received RTPs of 4.5:1 or greater; only five categories of claimants
receiving an RTP received RTPs of 1:1 or smaller.  Perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the minimum RTP for a punitive damages eligible subclass
was 5:1.
What, if anything, does this suggest?  Parties perhaps recognize that
Exxon Shipping’s 1:1 ratio may not extend to all oil spills.95  There
94. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
95. Recidivism may be an important factor here. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 577 (1996) (“Our holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first
offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance
of malfeasance.”).  BP had an extensive history of past civil and criminal violations, which may
have justified the imposition of harsher punitive damages awards.  Jad Mouawad, For BP, a
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may also be other factors that increase the value of settling now rather
than continuing to litigate the issue, even if the 1:1 ratio would extend
to all oil spills.96
But, to the extent that the RTPs reflect an embedded punitive dam-
ages component, are such damages justified by a societal economic
deterrence rationale in this case?  While the damage to society caused
by the BP oil spill is difficult to measure, a possible relevant, if imper-
fect,97 benchmark is the Exxon Valdez oil spill.98  The Exxon Valdez
oil spill cost Exxon roughly $7.2 billion in 2012 dollars.99  BP has paid
more than that in cleanup costs alone ($14 billion)100 and faces
History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009, at A22, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09bp.html?pagewanted=all.
96. Issacharoff and Rave emphasize the “peace premium” BP secures by ending most litiga-
tion and putting the issue to rest. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 3, at 414–16 (discussing
how settling many claims at once is worth more to the defendant than settling each claim individ-
ually).  Another related factor might be reputational interest. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532
(1991) (discussing how reputational concerns motivate certain parties to settle and behave in a
risk-averse fashion, while motivating other parties to litigate aggressively).  Yet another factor
may be a fear of damages being so large as to be fatal to the company. Id.
97. The total damages and fines paid out, respectively, by Exxon and BP are an unreliable
measure of the comparative scope of the environmental and societal harm inflicted.  Such a
measure does not account for the particular litigation strategy pursued by each defendant.
Moreover, an alternative explanation for the higher damages and penalties faced by BP is the
existence of the Oil Pollution Act, which was enacted in the wake of Exxon Valdez for the
express purpose of increasing the scope of recovery for claimants injured by oil spills. See In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F.
Supp. 2d 943, 959 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th
Cir. 2014).  The OPA dramatically altered the civil litigation landscape. See Oil Pollution Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, sec. 4301, § 311(b)(7), 104 Stat. 484, 536–37, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)
(2012) (massively increasing the penalties for discharging oil in violation of the Act).  The cur-
rent penalties are $2,100 per barrel for an illegal discharge, and $5,300 per barrel for an illegal
discharge involving gross negligence.  40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2015).
98. The Exxon Valdez oil spill involved 11 million gallons of oil, whereas the BP oil spill was
estimated to involve between 103 to 176 million gallons. See Michael Kunzelman, BP Trial in
New Orleans Marked by Conflicting Estimates of Gulf Spill Size, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/bp-trial-new-orleans_n_4058111.html.
99. Exxon paid $1.015 billion (plus at least $175 million in interest) in compensatory and puni-
tive damages. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008); see also Exxon Valdez
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that interest on the $507.5
million punitive damages judgment should run from 1996).  Exxon also paid $925 million in civil
and criminal fines, $303 million in voluntary settlement payments, and approximately $2.1 billion
in cleanup efforts. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 479.  If the nonjudgment costs are treated as
1990 dollars, the compensatory damages award are treated as 1996 dollars, and the punitive
damages award are treated as 2008 dollars, then the Exxon Valdez spill cost Exxon roughly $7.2
billion in 2012 dollars. See Morgan Friedman, The Inflation Calculator, WEST EGG,
www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (using data from the United States Cen-
sus Bureau).  A recent government report found that Exxon paid about $4.9 billion over twenty
years pursuant to several different legal proceedings and voluntary settlements or agreements.
RAMSEUR & HAGERTY, supra note 47, at 5.
100. RAMSEUR & HAGERTY, supra note 47, at 6.
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roughly $40 billion in additional civil and criminal liability and
fines.101
While these astronomical monetary figures give a sense of the scope
of the widespread damage inflicted, at the same time, the fact that
claims were vigorously pursued by the federal government and state
and local entities might obviate the need for further cost internaliza-
tion.  Indeed, the societal economic deterrence rationale for classwide
punitive damages may be blunted once one takes into account the full
picture of the regulatory (and even criminal) fines and penalties that
are typically assessed in widespread harm scenarios such as oil spills.
But this simply means that the strength of the case for societal dam-
ages based on economic deterrence will depend heavily on how ag-
gressively alternative cost-internalization mechanisms have been
pursued and enforced; and where there is no such aggressive pursuit
and enforcement, the justification has special force.
B. Classwide Punitive Damages in the Halliburton Settlement
On September 2, 2014, Halliburton reached a tentative global set-
tlement with two classes of punitive damages claimants.102  Hallibur-
ton has agreed to make an aggregate payment of $1.028 billion in
settlement of these combined class punitive damages claims.103  As ar-
gued above, the strongest normative justification for classwide puni-
101. BP has already paid out about $12.5 billion in noncleanup-related claims and an addi-
tional $4.5 billion in civil and criminal settlements. ERNST & YOUNG, GULF OF MEXICO OIL
SPILL CLAIMS AND OTHER PAYMENTS PUBLIC REPORT—MARCH 31, 2015 (2015), available at
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/gulf-of-mexico/Public_Report_March_2015.pdf; RAM-
SEUR & HAGERTY, supra note 47, at 8.
BP could face more than $18 billion in Clean Water Act penalties, especially because Judge
Barbier found it grossly negligent. See Appeals Court Won’t Rehear a BP Oil Spill Liability
Argument, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/09/us/ap-us-gulf-
oil-spill-bp.html.  BP has estimated that it will pay out an additional $5 billion or more in claims
per the Court Supervised Settlement Program.  Jennifer Larino, The Year in Business: BP Found
“Grossly Negligent” in Oil Spill, Loses Settlement Appeal, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/12/the_year_in_business_bp_found.html.  BP did
recoup $5.39 billion from other companies that settled with it. See supra note 53.
102. Notice of Filing of HESI Punitive Damages & Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement at
1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 13346, available at http://
www.laed.uscourts.gov/oilspill/9022014HESISettlement.pdf.
103. Halliburton Settlement, supra note 77, § 6(a), at 17, Doc. 13346:1.  A court-appointed
“Allocation Special Master” will allocate the aggregate payment between the Deepwater Hori-
zon Economic and Property Damages Settlement (DHEPDS) Class and the New Class. Id. § 7,
at 18–19.  After the money is allocated, members of the New Class will be able to pursue their
claims through a court-supervised claims program. Id. § 8(a), at 20.  The DHEPDS class money
will be placed in a trust and subject to further order of the court, which has discretion as to how
the money is allocated based on the DHEPDS. Id. § 9(b), at 25–26.
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tive damages is a nonretributive societal rationale such as economic
deterrence.  Moreover, classwide punitive damages based on such a
rationale should pass legal muster.
1. Unique Features of the Halliburton Settlement
Several unique features of the Halliburton classwide punitive dam-
ages settlement complicate its evaluation in this light.  First, the BP
settlement, while releasing all punitive damages claims against itself,
not only specifically reserved the claimants’ punitive damages claims
against its codefendants, but also (more controversially) assigned BP’s
punitive damages claims against its codefendants to claimants.  Sec-
ond, two days after the Halliburton settlement, Judge Barbier ruled
that Halliburton’s conduct was merely negligent and thus not subject
to punitive damages.
a. Punitive Damages Assigned and Reserved Under the BP
Settlement
Under the BP Settlement, BP’s codefendants Transocean and Halli-
burton remain subject to punitive damages claims from some victims
of the BP oil spill.  The settlement releases BP and all its codefendants
from all but certain specific reserved claims in exchange for BP’s crea-
tion of an extensive compensation program and settlement trust fund.
Under the terms of the settlement, two main groups are eligible for
punitive damages, as discussed below.104
i. Economic Fund Class’ assigned claims
BP assigned many of its legal claims against Transocean and Halli-
burton, including its punitive damage claims,105 to the Court Super-
104. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, at 12, Exhibit 21, at 5–7, Doc.
6430-39 (reserving the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims against Halliburton and Transocean
and assigning BP’s punitive damages claims to an assigned claims class).  There is a third poten-
tial group of plaintiffs who are eligible for punitive damages: those who opted out or were never
included in the settlement agreement but still meet the requirements under Robins Dry Dock.
According to Issacharoff and Rave, only 1.2% of claimants opted out of the settlement. See
Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 3, at 426.
105. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibit 21, at 5–6, Doc. 6430-39
(assigning “punitive, exemplary, multiple, or non-compensatory damages”).  The Economic
Fund Settlement Agreement assigns six additional types of damages to the Economic Class.  In
addition to punitive damages, BP assigns its claims for (1) damages relating to the repair of the
MC-252 Well; (2) “economic damages for the loss of the MC-252 Well”; (3) response costs in-
curred to contain the spill; (4) “[a]ll rights to indemnity, contribution, or subrogation for claims
paid by BP and/or the GCCF on or before the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order”; (5)
“indemnification, contribution, [and] subrogation” actions for reimbursement of Settlement Pay-
ments; and (6) “[a]ll claims and causes of action to recover the damages, losses, costs, fees, and
[other] amounts.” Id.
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vised Settlement Plan’s Economic and Property Damages Settlement
Agreement class (Assigned Claims Class).106  While BP has indemni-
fied Transocean and Halliburton for third-party compensatory dam-
ages claims, it has not done so for punitive damages claims or for its
own assigned claims against Transocean and Halliburton.107
The Assigned Claims Class is unusual because the claims are as-
signed to the class as a separate entity from its individual members.108
Specifically, BP assigned its punitive damages claims “to the Eco-
nomic Class, only as a juridical entity and not to Economic Class
Members individually.”109  Moreover, under the terms of the settle-
ment, BP warrants that it “will not oppose the motion . . . seeking to
certify a litigation class against Transocean or Halliburton,” as long as
the relief sought by the class is “limited to the recovery of punitive
damages and/or assigned rights from the BP Parties.”110
ii. Commercial fishermen’s reserved claims
As mentioned above, commercial fishermen—as well as individuals
who suffered physical damage to a proprietary interest—fall outside
the Robins Dry Dock limitation barring remedies for pure economic
106. The Assigned Claims Class can seek compensatory damages from Transocean or Halli-
burton only for assigned claims (as BP would be liable for third-party claims under its indemnifi-
cation arrangement with Transocean and Halliburton).  Transocean and Halliburton cross-
claimed against BP and asserted that BP was required to defend and indemnify them from all
claims and liabilities stemming from the BP oil spill. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 841 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (E.D. La. 2012)
(regarding BP’s contractual indemnification obligation to Transocean); In re Oil Spill by the Oil
Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2012 WL
273726, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2012) (regarding Halliburton and indemnification).  Judge
Barbier has ruled that BP is required to indemnify Transocean and Halliburton from third-party
compensatory damages claims, regardless of whether they are based on strict liability, negli-
gence, or gross negligence. In re Oil Spill, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1009; In re Oil Spill, 2012 WL
273726, at *2.
107. In two decisions, Judge Barbier held that BP does not owe Transocean or Halliburton
indemnity for any punitive damages or civil penalties incurred under the Clean Water Act. In re
Oil Spill, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1009; In re Oil Spill, 2012 WL 273726, at *2–3.
108. The Assigned Claims Class is an atypical class.  Given that the claims are only derived
from one party (BP), then assigned to another single entity (the Economic Fund Class), there
are not multiple parties making claims that would justify a class action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)
(“[T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . . . .”).  Rather, there is
a single entity (albeit one constituting a preexisting certified class) making a single set of claims,
just as if BP had retained the claims and sued Transocean and Halliburton.  The assignment of
such punitive damages claims remains untested.  While much recent scholarship argues in favor
of lifting restraints on the alienation of legal claims, much uncertainty in judicial practice re-
mains. See generally Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J.
697, 699 (2005).
109. Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, Exhibit 21, § 1.1.3.6, at 5–6, Doc.
6430-39.
110. Id. § 7.2, at 62, Doc. 6430-1.
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losses.111  Such claimants, therefore, can pursue punitive damages
claims because they could have pursued these claims under general
maritime law.112
Under the terms of the BP Settlement Agreement, the plaintiffs’
claims for punitive damages against Transocean and Halliburton were
specifically reserved.113  Thus, a subclass of the Economic Fund Class
(Reserved Claims Class)—comprised primarily of commercial fisher-
men—could bring a punitive damages class action lawsuit against Hal-
liburton and Transocean.
The Halliburton Settlement is comprised of the Assigned Claims
Class as well as the Reserved Claims Class.114
b. Judge Barbier’s Punitive Damages Ruling
Halliburton’s settlement eliminated the risk of an adverse ruling by
Judge Barbier that would have exposed them to increased punitive
damages liability.115
Two days after entry of the settlement, on September 4, 2014, Judge
Barbier ruled on the allocation of responsibility between BP, Halli-
burton, and Transocean and whether their respective conduct war-
ranted punitive damages.116  Judge Barbier found BP primarily
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr.
20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745
F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014).
113. See Economic Fund Settlement Agreement, supra note 11, at 12, Doc. 6430-1 (“Claims of
the Economic Class, Plaintiffs, and Economic Class Members for punitive damages against
HALLIBURTON and TRANSOCEAN are reserved.” (emphasis added)); see also id. Exhibit
26, at 5, Doc. 6430-45 (“‘Expressly Reserved Claims’ means [inter alia] . . . claims for punitive or
exemplary damages against Halliburton and Transocean subject to the provisions of Section 11
of the Settlement Agreement.”).  Doc. 6430-45 is the Full and Final Release, Settlement, and
Covenant Not to Sue. Id. at 3.
114. Halliburton Settlement, supra note 77, at 4–5, Doc. 13346:1.  The Assigned Claims Class,
named the “Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement (DHEPDS)
Agreement Class,” includes all members of the BP Economic Fund Class in the BP settlement
agreement. Id. § 5(d), at 8, 10.  The Reserved Claims Class, which includes commercial fisher-
men and persons who suffered physical damage to a proprietary interest, is dubbed the “New
Class.” Id. § 4, at 5–6.
115. See Clifford Krauss, Halliburton To Pay $1.1 Billion To Settle Damages in Gulf Oil Spill,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/business/en-
ergy-environment/halliburton-to-pay-1-1-billion-to-settle-damages-in-gulf-of-mexico-oil-
spill.html?_r=0 (“Legal scholars following the case said that Halliburton was making a calculated
judgment that it was preferable to agree to pay the relatively modest $1.1 billion than face larger
liabilities in the future.  They said the settlement should resolve most of its remaining liability for
the spill, even if the company is found to have been grossly negligent by Judge Carl J.
Barbier . . . .”).
116. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: Phase One Trial, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La.
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responsible (67%), followed by Transocean (30%), and, to a much
lesser extent, Halliburton (3%).117  With respect to punitive damages,
Judge Barbier concluded that Transocean and Halliburton were
merely negligent and thus should not be subject to punitive dam-
ages.118  Conduct by BP’s employees, by contrast, was deemed reck-
less, and thus, in theory, subject to punitive damages.119  However, in
light of Fifth Circuit precedent limiting vicarious liability of employers
for punitive damages in the maritime context, Judge Barbier con-
cluded that BP was, in fact, not liable for punitive damages.120
2. Are Classwide Punitive Damages Justified?
As a preliminary matter, we return to our discussion of Judge Jack
Weinstein, who paved the way for the punitive damages class.  In
terms of doctrinal objections to classwide punitive damages, relative
to the decertified punitive damages class in In re Simon II, the puni-
tive damages class in the BP case is more attractive (or less problem-
atic).  The BP catastrophe (like the Exxon Valdez disaster) is a
singular incident that caused ecological and societal damages on an
unprecedented scale, rather than individual incidents of harm over
many years (as in the tobacco context of In re Simon II).  Given that
the entire case is governed by federal law, there are no troublesome
choice-of-law issues.  Moreover, unlike the In re Simon II scenario,
there was a preexisting certified class (Economic Fund Class) for set-
tlement of compensatory damages,121 which eliminates the “cart-
before-the-horse” concern.
2012) (MDL No. 2179), Doc. 13355, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/courts/laed/9042014
FindingsofFactandConclusionsofLaw.pdf.
117. Id. ¶ 544, at 136.
118. Id. ¶ 543, at 135.
119. Id. ¶ 545, at 136.
120. Id. ¶¶ 561–67, at 140–42.  Judge Barbier did conclude that under the Ninth Circuit or
First Circuit rules governing punitive damages in these kinds of cases, BP would be liable. Id. ¶¶
570–71, at 142.
121. The Reserved Claims Class (which is a subclass of the already-certified Economic Fund
Class), however, sought punitive damages without seeking compensatory damages. See supra
note 104 (explaining that only punitive damages claims against Transocean and Halliburton were
reserved).  Recall dicta from the Second Circuit in In re Simon II to the effect that “[i]n certify-
ing a class that seeks an assessment of punitive damages prior to an actual determination and
award of compensatory damages, the district court’s Certification Order would fail to ensure
that a jury will be able to assess an award that, in the first instance, will bear a sufficient nexus to
the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff class . . . .”  Simon II Litig. v. Philip Morris USA
Inc. (In re Simon II Litig.), 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).  One key difference lies in the fact
that the compensatory damages for the Reserved Claims Class was previously certified for settle-
ment purposes, so there is a relevant baseline.  Moreover, jurisdictions are split on whether (as
the Second Circuit posited) compensatory damages are a prerequisite for the award of punitive
damages. Compare, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1262 (Fla. 2006) (“[A]n
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But I am more interested in the question that, hitherto, has not
been asked: namely, how the existence of the embedded societal dam-
ages within the BP settlement impacts an evaluation of the necessity
for (and size of) any further supra-compensatory damages, whether or
not expressly termed punitive damages.  The BP class action settle-
ment, via the RTP multipliers, embedded a form of classwide societal
damages. Moreover, by specifically reserving the claimants’ claims for
punitive damages, it opened up the possibility—eventually realized
with the Halliburton settlement—that the claimants could receive fur-
ther classwide supra-compensatory damages.
V. CONCLUSION: CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
AND SOCIETAL DETERRENCE
The BP oil spill litigation and ensuing class action settlements with
BP and Halliburton provide an illuminating lens with which to explore
the continuing vitality of a nonretributive societal rationale for class-
wide supra-compensatory damages.  The Halliburton settlement ex-
pressly governs aggregated punitive damages claims, but the BP
(ostensibly) compensatory class settlement likewise contains supra-
compensatory multipliers that are a trademark of a societal damages
conception of punitive damages.
award of compensatory damages is not a prerequisite to a finding of entitlement to punitive
damages.  Compensatory and punitive damages serve distinct purposes.”), with, e.g., Sanderson
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 251 P.3d 1213, 1221 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A] claim for exem-
plary damages is not ‘a separate and distinct cause of action,’ but rather ‘is auxiliary to an under-
lying claim for actual damages’ and thus can be entered only in conjunction with an underlying
and successful claim for actual damages assessed against a wrongdoer . . . .” (quoting Kirk v.
Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991))).
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